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     The persistence of the market power in the fixed telecommunication markets in both developed and 
developing economies is due to the technical and economic features of this industry. This paper provides an 
overview of these characteristics and changes. It also suggests a comparative critical survey of the access pricing 
theories that are “the key” to the transition to the competition in the fixed telecommunication segment. Through 
this overview, we aim to underline among that the central role that the regulation should play to ensure the 
establishment of sustainable competition in the fixed telecommunication markets.  
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1 Introduction 
« The antitrust doctrine (…) should be more 
interested in protecting consumers (…) than in 
protecting competitors (…), or to put it 
differently, that competition is often a means to 
enhance consumer welfare, but in no way an 
end. » 
By the Nobel Laureate 2014, Jean Tirole :  
« The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer »,  
Competition Policy International, 
Vol.1, No.1, Spring 2005, p.2. 
Until the late 1980s, the telecom industry 
structure in most countries around the world was an 
integrated state public monopoly. Over this period, 
there is a common belief across economists and 
governments that competition is not convenient for 
telecommunication markets. Technical 
characteristics and economic properties of the 
telecom activities were the main arguments usually 
advanced to justify the negative position toward 
competition. It was argued that telecom activities 
have natural monopoly properties given the high 
costs of infrastructures and service provision, and 
thereby, the monopoly structure leads to more 
efficiencies than competition markets. Furthermore, 
for a long time, the telecom service remains a luxury 
good, especially for users with lower willingness to 
pay (WTP) and in the area or market segments 
where the provision of the telecom services is more 
costly (e.g., rural area, local telephony segment) 
compared to others (e.g., urban area, international 
telephony segment). The public monopoly provider 
is thereby argued to be the best organization which 
is able to reach the policy objective of serving all 
users, segments and areas at lower prices 
(Universal Service Provision). Deficit resulting from 
the obligation of universal service provision is, 
indeed, covered through cross-subsidies between 
different categories of services and users provided 
by a single public firm (Kerf and Geradin 1999; 
Oldale and Padilla 2004). 
The rapid progress in technologies of the 
digitalization by the begining of 1990s results in 
radical change in the cost structure of telecom 
activities. In particular, the costs of end-users 
services provision are dramatically reduced. 
Traditional telecom services such as telegraph, 
telephone and Internet access, as well as the new 
services, including e-mails and video are available 
for a large part of population at lower prices. 
However, the establishment of installations and 
equipments and the construction of the fixed 
network lines (local loop), which serve as essential 
facilities (input) to provide end-user services, are 
still expensive and; thereby, preserve their natural 
monopoly features (Kerf and Geradin 1999; Cowhey 
and Klimenko 2001). 
This transformation in the cost structure has 
modified substantially the traditional conception of 
telecom activities organization that highlights the 
benefits of public monopoly. Competition is at least 
sustainable in telecom market segments where the 
end-users benefit from lower prices and greater 
quality choices provided by different rivals. 
Furthermore, private companies are proved to be 
much better than public ones in term of efficiencies 
(Kerf and Geradin 1999). Therefore, in a large 
number of countries, the historical public monopoly 
(the incumbent) is partially or wholly privatized and 
is facing rivals in the end-user service telecom 
markets but, it still maintains its traditional position 
as monopoly in infrastructures. The rivals are, 
indeed, permitted to access to the incumbent‟s 
infrastructures against an access price in order to 
provide their services to end-users. This last form of 
organization of telecom activities has the advantage 
to avoid the waste of the resources in the segments 
that maintain their natural monopoly characteristics 
(infrastructures) and to benefit from the advantage 
of competition (lower prices, welfare gains) in 
segments where technology progress has permitted 
the provision of large varieties of end-users services 
at lower costs. However, this industry structure does 
not guarantee sustainable competition. The 
historical integrated monopoly, the exclusive 
provider of infrastructures, has indeed both the 
ability and the motivation to discriminate its rivals by 
setting high access price in order to preserve its 
historical profits of monopoly. Earlier theoretical 
literature provides extensive developments in this 
last concern. The essential of the debate seeks to 
determine the optimal access pricing solution that 
permits to ensure simultaneously two controversial 
policy objectives: (1) financing the infrastructure 
construction costs incurred by the incumbent (2) 
ensuring the benefits of competition (lower end-user 
prices, maximizing consumer welfare). In this line, 
Laffont and Tirole (1996) note that “the 
determination of interconnection charges is the key 
to the introduction of competition in 
telecommunications”2. A large part of practical 
access pricing solutions suggested in the regulatory 
frameworks are inspired from these theoretical 
models. Regulatory practices including access 
pricing policies and others have a great role in 
introducing and promoting sustainable competition, 
by controlling the incumbent‟s abuse of market 
power in order to protect consumers and rivals.   
This paper proposes to provide an overview of 
the technological and economic challenges and 
changes, as well as the theories that are the key to 
the transition to competition telecommunication 
markets. In particular, the rest of this chapter is 
organized as follows. In section 2, we give a 
description of the technological and economic 
characteristics and mutations in the 
telecommunication industry; and then we explore 
their implications in order to understand the 
difficulties that regulators actually face to control the 
market power of the dominant historical operator 
and thereby establish sustainable competition. In 
section 3, we review the theoretical foundations of 
access pricing regulatory approaches as the key to 
the creation of competition telecommunication 
markets. In section 4, we conclude.   
2. The technical and economic characteristics of 
the telecommunication industry  
   The telecommunication industry has a number of 
characteristics that explain broadly the difficulty to 
introduce and ensure effective competition in these 
markets. First, the provision of end-user services 
requires to connect to network infrastructures (the 
local loop) which is costly to duplicate by entrants, 
and thereby, constitute a crucial source of market 
power for the historical integrated monopoly (the 
incumbent).  Second, the telecom activities are 
characterized by their natural monopoly features: (1) 
the importance of the role of the network 
externalities that characterize the demand side (2) 
the importance of economies of scale and scope 
that characterize the supply side (Laffont and Tirole 
2000).  
                                                          
2 Laffont, J.-J., and Tirole, J. (1996):” Creating 
Competition Through Interconnection: Theory and 
Practice”,  Journal of Regulatory Economic 10, p. 227. 
. 
2.1 The Telecommunication Technologies:   key 
components and main changes 
   In this paragraph, we give a presentation of the 
key elements of the infrastructure network 
technologies and the main technology mutations in 
order to understand the polemic role of regulation, 
especially after the introduction of the competition, 
based on the technical Local Loop overview in 
Rysavy (1998), Laffont and Tirole (2000), Fornefeld, 
Delaunay and Elixmann (2008), Silver (2008) and 
Ödling et al. (2009). 
Telecom network infrastructures are composed of 
the following three main parts: 
▫ The Outside Plant (OP): it includes the 
various kinds of transmission technologies 
such as cables (buried and aerial), 
manholes, poles, terminals and equipment 
installed in the subscribers‟ locals (called 
Customer-premises equipment or 
customer-provided equipment (CPE))3. 
▫ The central office (CO): a construction 
where different equipment (switches, 
routers, etc.) are installed and used to 
connect to the CPE and to other central 
offices.   
▫ Inter-Office Facilities (IOF) which consists 
in various equipment and cables that lay 
the different central offices. 
 Transmission technologies (or conductors) can be 
wireline (fixed) (e.g., pairs of copper lines, fiber 
optics, etc.) or wireless (mobile) (e.g., satellite, 
etc.)4. They permit the transport of signals from the 
terminal of customer (the CPE) to the Central Office 
or other remote equipment and vice versa. These 
signals are treated and transformed into information 
data (voice, video, etc.) by using different devices 
(switches, routers, etc.). 
The traditional transmission technologies (copper 
telephone lines), also called Public Switched 
Telephone Network (PSTN), are characterized by 
their limited capacities5. They permit to provide the 
                                                          
3  The CPE consists on the terminal or equipment such as 
telephones, routers, switches, modems and others used to 
connect customer. See for further details Wikipedia 
available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Customer-
premises_equipment.  
4 In this thesis, we only interest in fixed infrastructure 
technologies. 
5 Capacity is the maximum amounts of data transferred 
along the network infrastructures. It is measured using as 
early end-user services (e.g., telephone, telegraph 
and fax) and later Internet access services via dial 
up modems at low speeds (lower than 64kbit/s). The 
dial up modem has the inconvenience that it does 
not permit to transmit data and voice at the same 
time. Figure 1 gives a presentation of these 
traditional infrastructure technologies. 
 
Figure  1: The traditional Infrastructure Networks6 
 The introduction of the new techniques of data 
compression, the various Digital Subscriber Line 
technologies (ADSL, HDSL, VDSL, etc.)7, have 
considerably ameliorated the capacities of the 
copper lines by generating digital signals instead of 
analog signals and provided to operators more 
flexibility to offer new services (e.g., video) in 
addition to the traditional retail services (e.g., voice). 
Digital Subscriber Lines technologies provide 
speeds of connection that reach 100 Mb/s. In the 
begining of 1990s, more advanced infrastructure 
technologies of transmission emerged. These are 
the fiber optics lines (e.g., fiber-to-the building 
(FTTB), fiber-to-the-curb (FTTC)). Fiber lines are 
made from pure glass that permits light transmission 
for long distances. They provide very high 
capacities which permit the operators to offer large 
diversities of end- user services at a relatively low 
marginal cost and at speeds that can reach 1 Gb/s. 
Digital subscriber lines via traditional copper 
telephone lines as well as fiber optic lines refer to 
the so-called fixed broadband infrastructure 
technologies, because they provide high capacities 
of data transmissions that allow very high speeds of 
connection (that exceed 2Mbit/s). In figure 2, we 
give a presentation of these new telecom network 
infrastructures.  
                                                                                    
units of measures: the bits per second or multiples of it 
(bit/s, kbit/s, Mbit/s, Gbit/s, etc.).  
6 Source: 
http://pnb.mixxt.com/networks/files/download.144216  
7 See Ödling et al. (2009) for further details about these 
technologies.  
 
Figure  2: The current telecom network infrastructures: a 
representation8 
  The fixed costs (initial or one-time costs) of fiber 
lines are very high compared to those of copper 
lines. Therefore, in most countries, after the 
introduction of competition, the historical integrated 
monopolies (incumbent operators) do not replace 
their traditional networks (copper local loop lines) by 
these new advanced technologies (fiber-optic local 
loops9). Entrants are preferred to access to a part 
(mixed entry) or wholly (resale entry) to the existent 
traditional network of the incumbent against an 
access price (services-based entry), in order to 
provide their end-user services rather than building 
their own network infrastructures facilities (facilities-
based entry)10. The traditional telephone networks 
called the Local loop, defined as the last part of the 
network from the incumbent‟s last switch to the CPE 
                                                          
8 This presents an example of architecture of actual 
network infrastructures which are composed on a myriad 
of several technologies (fiber and copper lines with DSL 
technologies). Source: 
<http://www.intechopen.com/books/programmable-logic-
controller/new-applications-using-plcs-in-access-   
networks>.  
9 Few countries use fiber optics lines. These technologies 
are installed in long-distance segments (Laffont  and 
Tirole 2000). 
10 Laffont  and Tirole (2000) define three forms of entry 
in telecom industry: 
  (1) Facilities-based entry: the entrant has its own 
network facilities and not need to access to existent 
infrastructure owned by the incumbent.  
  (2) Resale: the entrant leases the entire network 
infrastructure from the incumbent at access price to 
provide its retail services. 
  (3) Mixed entry: the entrant leases a part of existent 
facilities and builds others. The best known example is 
entry using digital subscriber line technologies.  
The two later forms of entry (resale and mixed entry) are 
the most available in most countries in the globe while 
the first form of entry (facility-based entry) is rarely 
adopted given the high costs of these infrastructures. 
(see figure 2), is qualified as essential facilities or 
bottleneck (Mason and Valletti 2001), because it is 
costly to duplicate by entrants and it is a necessary 
component to provide end-users services.  
2. The economies of the telecommunication 
industry  
    Network externalities and cost structures that 
lead to economies of scale and scope are not 
unique to network industries (e.g. 
telecommunications, transportation, railroad, water, 
energy and others). They also characterize certain 
non-network industries. In general, these economic 
rules concern most vertically related industries 
where products delivered to end-users are 
composite goods (Economides 1996).  
    Complementarity between services is a law in the 
telecom industry. For example, sending an e-mail 
needs access to Internet through subscribing 
Internet connection from the Internet Service 
Provider ISP that in turn should purchases access 
to standard telephone lines from incumbent. The 
importance of network externalities and economies 
of scale and scope in telecommunication activities 
influences industry structures and decisions of 
subscriptions, pricing and investment in qualities of 
services made by different actors (consumers, 
regulators, governments and providers) in network 
markets. In this paragraph, we intend to present 
these main economic rules and their implications, in 
particular, in term of industry structures and 
regulation.  
2.1 The cost structures  
    The telecom network activities are characterized 
by cost structures that reveal the properties of the 
natural monopoly11. The formal definition of “the 
                                                          
8 It is important to understand the difference between the 
concepts of “Monopoly” and “Natural Monopoly” before 
beginning. According to Gans (2012, p.2), “A monopoly 
describes a situation where all (or most) sales in an 
industry or market are undertaken by a single firm. A 
natural monopoly is a characteristic of an industry or 
market whereby it is most efficient (that is, involves the 
lowest production costs), to have a single firm 
responsible for all production in that industry. 
Consequently, the condition for a natural monopoly is a 
technological characteristic of an industry or market 
rather than a description of its observed market 
structure. Monopolies can exist in industries that are not 
Natural Monopoly” is given by Baumol (1977): The 
natural monopoly is an “industry in which multiform 
production is more costly than production by a 
monopoly”12. In other words, the natural monopoly is 
the case of an industry where the production by a 
single firm is more efficient than the production by 
several firms. Baumol (1977, p. 810) also provides a 
mathematical justification for the concept of the 
natural monopoly, which consists in the notion of 
sub-additively of the cost production function that is 
formally given by the following formula: 
                      ∑    
 
  ∑      
 
  for a given vector of 
output levels   ,       , where   is the number 
of products. 
The first term of the formula represents the 
monopoly„s production costs of n products. The 
second term refers to the sum of production costs 
incurred by n distinct firms, each firm i produces the 
output i.  
The fixed costs uncured to build the telecom 
infrastructure installations are significant and often 
irrecoverable (sunk costs), while the marginal costs 
of provision of end user services (e.g., making a 
call) are relatively very low. This cost structure leads 
to economies of scale and scope. The economies of 
scale imply that the average costs of production are 
decreasing on quantity of outputs (final services 
provided). The economies of scope occur when 
productive efficiency (lowest production costs) is 
ensured by conferring all products a single firm (a 
monopoly).  
2.2 The network externalities 
   The telecom services generate positive and/or 
negative network externalities (also known as 
network effects), which means that the satisfaction 
(utility) that a subscriber derives from purchasing a 
service is respectively affected positively and/or 
negatively by the number of people using it in an 
associated network  (Margolis and Liebowitz 1994). 
The telephone service is more valuable for a 
subscriber if there are more network users that can 
communicate with him. Similarly, each subscriber of 
Internet connection enjoys benefits to be able to 
share services with other users (communication, 
                                                                                    
natural monopolies and monopolies may not arise in 
industries that are natural monopolies.”  
12 Baumol, W. (1977): “On the Proper Cost Tests for 
Natnral Monopoly in a Multiproduct Industry”, American 
Economic Review 67, p. 810. 
chatting, sending and receiving emails, files, video 
and others, connecting to social networks such as 
Facebook, etc.). The higher the number of the 
Internet users is, the higher the satisfaction of the 
subscriber from the Internet connection is. 
Therefore, the telephone service and the Internet 
connection generate positive consumption 
externalities. However, if the number of users 
exceeds a certain level that the technical capacities 
of the network permit, the quality of the Internet 
connection perceived by the subscriber may 
deteriorate (e.g., Packet loss of data, blocking web 
pages) and; thereby, the satisfaction of the Internet 
user decreases. This last effect represents an 
example of the negative network externalities.  
Katz and Shapiro (1985) distinguish two types of 
positive consumption externalities: the direct 
externalities that occur when the utility of a given 
subscriber increases with the number of other users 
and the indirect externalities that arise when the 
quality and the variety of services increase with the 
number of subscribers. These two types of 
externalities combined together lead to double 
externality effect that implies that the value of a 
network increases with the number of the people 
that have joined it (suppliers and subscribers): the 
benefits of a service provider increases with sales 
(or the number of subscribers) and the utility of a 
customer increases with the number of services 
provided (or number of providers) (Penard 2002). 
According to Metcalfe’s law, the value of a network 
is equal or close to square of the number of its 
users (Mason and Valletti 2001).  
2.3 The economic characteristics and the 
persistence of the market power in the fixed 
telecommunication markets 
    The importance of both network externalities and 
economies of scale and scope justify the dominance 
of structure of monopoly as industry organization in 
the past over countries in the world and the 
difficulties that policy makers actually face to ensure 
effective competition in whole telecom markets (see, 
Mason and Valletti 2001; Boylaud and Giuseppe 
2001; Penard 2002).  
Two arguments are often advanced against opening 
telecom markets to competition. The first one is the 
Schumpeter’s hypothesis. It is usually argued that 
the larger firms, in particular a monopoly, profit 
better from economies of scale and scope than the 
smaller firms13 and; therefore, they are more able to 
reach allocative efficiency (the maximum total 
welfare of the industry) because they have the 
largest production and market shares, which implies 
more resources to innovate (see Valleti 2003) . 
Sharing sales revenue between several service 
telecom providers raises problems of financing 
these significant and irrecoverable fixed costs of 
establishment of network infrastructures facilities.  
The second argument is that the economies of 
scale and scope combined with network 
externalities create a positive feedback mechanism 
that can be summarized as follows: a new service 
generates initially low positive consumption 
externalities. Once the demand for this service 
increases, its price decreases because of 
economies of scale. Therefore, demand increases 
(the law of demand). This mechanism repeats to 
infinity. According to Shapiro and Varian (1998), the 
great challenge for a provider, after introducing a 
new network service, is to reach the “critical mass” 
(i.e. sufficient numbers of clients) and then, the 
demand for this service will increase dramatically in 
presence of positive externalities and economies of 
scale and scope14. It is obvious that this mechanism 
works in favor of firm already has the largest market 
share and the lowest average costs of production 
(the historical integrated monopoly) in detriment of 
entrants that face to important entry costs of 
infrastructure building and smaller market shares. 
Shapiro and Varian (1998) note that “Positive 
feedback is the dynamic process by which the 
Strong gets stronger”, Chapter 7, p. 224.    
    The economic characteristics of 
telecommunication industry (network externalities 
and economies of scale and scope) explain broadly 
the difficulties to ensure effective competition.  In 
particular, number of regulatory concerns has risen. 
The main question is the access problem of 
entrants to existent network facilities owned by the 
historical integrated monopoly (the incumbent). In 
the next paragraph, we give a review of the different 
responses of the theory to this access problem. 
                                                          
13 See Henderson and Cockburn (1996), p.33. 
14  Shapiro and Varian (1998, p. 14) note that “Network 
effects lead to of scale and positive feedback. The key 
challenge is to obtain critical mass—after that, the going 
gets easier. Once you have a large enough customer base 
the market will build itself. “. 
3. The access pricing approaches: the 
theoretical foundations 
     The determination of reasonable access price to 
incumbent‟s facilities is a central question to 
introduce and then ensure sustainable competition. 
Indeed, a low access price increases consumer 
welfare, and promotes competition; but it raises the 
question of recovery of infrastructure fixed costs 
incurred by incumbent and problem of efficient entry 
(one-way access problem) (Armstrong 2002).  
   In general, the one way access problem arises in 
vertically integrated industries, where there are 
essential inputs provided by a monopoly to entrants 
to can offer their end-user services.  This is, in 
general, the case of all fixed segments in telecom 
industry in most countries in the world, where 
entrants need to access to whole or a part of the 
incumbent„s local loop in order to provide their final 
services15 (e.g., Internet connection, long distance 
telephone service, etc.). Various problems may 
result from such situation, where the price of this 
vital access service plays the major role. A too high 
access price may deter or even avoid entry 
(foreclosure), while a relatively low access price 
may lead to inefficient entry (Valleti 2003).  
    The theoretical access pricing approaches 
suggest different solutions that correspond to 
different situations and various regulatory objectives 
and settings (e.g., promoting competition, 
encouraging efficient entry, covering the 
incumbent‟s fixed costs, etc.).  Excellent and 
extensive reviews of this literature are given by 
Valleti and Estache (1998), Laffont and Tirole  
(2000), Armstrong (2002), Valleti (2003) and 
Vogelsang, (2003). In the rest of this paragraph, we 
give the key results of these benchmark access 
pricing theories and main associated critiques. 
3.1 The marginal pricing rule  
     The marginal pricing rule corresponds to the first 
best solution. It suggests pricing the access service 
to marginal cost of its provision. This requires that 
                                                          
15 The literature distinguishes the case of one-way access 
(access problem) from the two-way access 
(interconnection problem) in vertically industries where 
all providers need to purchase essential inputs (access to 
rival network) “from each other” to offer their final 
services (see e.g., Armstrong 2002). This later situation is 
generally the case of operators in mobile segments.  In 
our study, we interest only on the access problem.   
there are no types of imperfections (distortions) in 
the markets. This solution is derived in a particular 
setting when the monopolist bottleneck owner is 
vertically integrated. It operates in wholesale 
markets by providing a vital input (access service) to 
its rivals in the retail markets. The provision of one 
unit of retail service is assumed requiring exactly 
one unit of access service. The marginal costs of 
production of both retail and access services are 
constants and the retail services are perfect 
substitutes (homogenous goods). Further, it is 
assumed that the fixed costs (due to join and 
common costs of establishment of network 
infrastructures and others costs related to universal 
service obligations) are too low or financed by any 
other instruments outside the markets (e.g., 
government subsidies). The first-Best theory say 
that if all these hypothesizes are satisfied, the 
access price should be equal to marginal cost of the 
provision of the access service and the retail price 
should be equal to the sum of the access price and 
the marginal cost of the provision of the retail 
service. These solutions correspond to efficient 
prices that maximize the total surplus of the industry 
that is assumed to be computed as the sum of the 
consumer surplus and the profits of all providers. 
 
3.2 The Ramsey pricing Rule 
   In practice, the fixed costs uncured by the 
bottleneck provider are too high. In the absence of 
any state transfers (subsidies,  etc.) to cover these 
fixed costs, the application of the first-best marginal 
rule pricing leads to important losses (access deficit) 
for the bottleneck owner. The Ramsey rule which 
corresponds to the second best solution suggests 
overcoming this problem of fixed costs recovery by 
maximizing the total welfare of the industry under 
the incumbent‟s break-even constraint (total costs 
and revenue of the incumbent are equal - i.e. there 
are neither deficits nor benefits). This yields to the 
average pricing rule, which consists  to price the 
access service at the marginal cost of its provision 
majored by a mark-up equal to the ratio of fixed 
costs to the total demand for retail services.                                
                       
      However, the marginal rule is based on strong 
assumption that retail services are valued equally 
by end users. In the reality, consumers‟ valuations 
differ even if the qualities of retail services are 
identical.  The Ramsey Rule second best solution16 
                                                          
16 The Ramsey Access Pricing rule is suggested by 
Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Laffont and Tirole (1994). 
It is an extension of the original formula derived by 
suggests taking into account these demand 
characteristics by majoring the marginal cost of the 
access provision by a Ramsey term. This latter 
accounts for the demand changes due to a unit 
retail price variation (price elasticity of demand) and 
substitution and complementarity among services 
provided in wholesale and retail markets (see 
equation 2).  
                               
 
   
   
 ̂ ⏟
                           (1)                                 
                                           The Ramsey term 
 
Where: 
c refers to the marginal costs of production of the 
access service 
λ is the shadow price that balances the incumbent‟s 
budget constraint 
pr is the price of the retail service provided by the 
incumbent‟s rival 
 ̂  is the price “super-elasticity” of demand for the 
retail service provided by the incumbent‟s rival 
The formula, given by equation (1), refers to the 
Ramsey access pricing rule. 
 Retail prices can be obtained by applying the 
following Ramsey formulas17 which are inversely 
proportional to their corresponding super-
elasticities: 
           
    
 
 
   
 
 ̂   
                                                           (2) 
                                                                                                     
 




   
 
 ̂ 
                                                                (3)                                      
Where: 
pinc is the price of the retail service provided by the 
incumbent   
  ̂    is the price “super-elasticity” of demand for the 
retail  service provided by the incumbent   
Ramsey approach is therefore a global optimal 
pricing rule since it suggests determining 
simultaneously the optimal prices of all services in 
                                                                                    
Ramsey (1927) and Boiteux (1956) to determine prices of 
final goods provided by a multiproduct unregulated 
monopoly (Laffont and Tirole 1996).  
17 In addition to these formulas (2) and (3) ,  Laffont and 
Tirole (1994)  obtain at equilibrium  another formula by 
assuming that the access service  is another final good , 
that is given by:  
   
 
 
   
 
 ̂
                                                    
       ̂       
The problem of maximization of the total welfare of the 
industry under the incumbent’s break-even constraint is 
therefore reduced to the model suggested by Ramsey 
(1927) and Boiteux (1956) to determine prices of final 
goods provided by a multiproduct unregulated monopoly. 
Formula given by equation (1) is immediately obtained 
from (3) (see Laffont and Tirole 1996). 
both retail and wholesale segments of the industry. 
Following the Ramsey formulas, the incumbent‟s 
access deficit (fixed costs) is financed by the 
contribution of end-users that depend on their 
corresponding price super-elasticities of demand for 
retail services. Customers that are more sensitive to 
price variation participate less in financing these 
fixed costs.  The intuition behind the Ramsey 
approach that the total costs of the industry will be 
covered by aggregating the prices of all services. In 
other words, the revenue (over the marginal costs) 
generating from the more inelastic services 
compensates the losses that are due to pricing 
elastic service under their marginal costs.  The 
access deficit (the incumbent‟s fixed costs) is then 
covered without reducing the consumer surplus18.  
From theoretical perspective, Ramsey approach 
seems to give a complete answer to the access 
pricing problem by considering both allocative and 
productive efficiency objectives. The total consumer 
surplus is maximized. Further, the incumbent has no 
incentive to foreclosure the markets since it covers 
its costs. At the same time, only the efficient entry is 
encouraged since the prices reflect the true costs. 
From practical perspective, the Ramsey solution is 
difficult to be implemented although it reflects the 
complexity of the reality that characterizes costs 
and demand in the industry. Regulators cannot 
obtain sufficient information about costs and 
demand given the rapid technology changes in 
telecom industries. It is also argued that there are 
technical difficulties to determine the price 
elasticities of demand. Beside the important 
informational problem that the Ramsey rule 
presents, this approach is broadly criticized 
because it leads to the discrimination problems 
among both users and rivals in retail segments by 
requiring pricing rule based on the elasticities.  
Laffont and Tirole (1996) acknowledge the practice 
complexity, and the informational and technical 
problems of the Ramsey pricing rule. As a 
regulatory remedy, they propose the Global Price 
Caps policy, which consists in inducing the 
regulated firm (the monopolist bottleneck owner) to 
voluntary  choose the Ramsey pricing solutions 
through imposing price ceilings for all goods (both 
access and retail services) with correspondent 
weights that should be proportional to actual 
quantities of outputs and determined exogenously 
                                                          
18 The demand is still unchanged by considering these 
super-elasticities. 
by the regulator19. As pointed out by these authors, 
this Global price cap remedy has some limitations in 
practice. First, in order to achieve Ramsey pricing 
through this Global price cap policy, regulators must 
be able to compute correct weights based on actual 
quantities of outputs. This requires precise 
information about actual demand for goods. 
Second, there is the risk of predation problem, 
which occurs when incumbent sets appropriate 
access price but too low retail price (below the 
marginal costs) (or appropriate retail prices but too 
high access price) so as the global price cap is 
achieved. This may deteriorate the competitor‟s 
margin and therefore discourage competition.  
3.3 The Baumol-Willig Efficient Component-
Pricing Rule (ECPR) 
This access pricing approach is proposed by Willig 
(1979) and Baumol (1983) and then elaborated in 
Baumol and Sidak (1994)20. The ECPR states 
pricing the essential intermediate service (the 
access to the bottleneck) at the direct (per-unit 
incremental / marginal) cost21 of its provision 
majored by the incumbent‟s opportunity costs. This 
latter corresponds to the loss of the incumbent‟s 
retail sales which is due to the provision of access 
to entrants.22 The ECPR suppose that the following 
three assumptions hold. First, the markets are 
perfectly contestable (absence of externalities, no 
barriers to enter, no sunk costs). Second, the 
integrated monopolist bottleneck owner (the 
                                                          
19 The formula of this Global price cap   ̅is the following 
                  ̅ /   ̅,       ̅    and 
    ̅  where               correspond respectively 
to weights of the access service, the retail services 
provided by incumbent and its rival, and                  
are respectively the prices of the access service, the retail 
services provided by incumbent and its rival while  ̅,  ̅    
and  ̅        respectively the expected quantities of  the 
access service, the retail services provided by incumbent 
and its rival. 
20 See Armstrong (2002). 
21 The term “direct cost” corresponds to all costs incurred 
by the bottleneck owner to provide access service that are 
not included in the opportunity costs. The incremental 
cost is the increase in total costs of the firm when it 
provides additional unit of output (increment) while the 
marginal cost is the rise in their total costs due to small 
increase in its outputs. In particular, if the increment is 
small the marginal cost is equal to the incremental cost 
(Baumol and Sidak 1994).   
22 See Baumol and Sidak (1994); Baumol, Ordover, and 
Willig (1997); Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1996) and 
Armstrong (2002). 
incumbent) and its rivals (entrants) in the retail 
segment provide perfect substitute services at a 
given incumbent‟s retail price      assumed to be 
determined optimally outside the model. Third, the 
sole way for an entrant to obtain the essential input 
is to buy it from the incumbent (“no bypass 
possibilities”). In the particular case where the 
provision of one unit of retail service requires 
exactly one unit of access service, the ECPR 
Access pricing rule is given by the following 
formula23: 
                  
            ⏟                                        ⏟            (4)                              
 c: The direct marginal cost  of providing access           
              ⏟   : The bottleneck owner‟s opportunity costs 
(by a unit of access provided) 
The ECPR formula can be re-written as the price 
minus the marginal cost of the retail service 
provided by incumbent. This may be immediately 
deduced from (4) as follows: 
         ⏟                                                                                    (5)                                                 
  The incumbent’s margin in the retail market 
     (by unit of output) 
The ECPR is also called the margin rule because it 
states that the margin available to entrant (     
before deducing its retail costs    , is equal to the 
incumbent‟s marginal costs      in the retail 
segment. Therefore, the ECPR access price gives 
correct information about the market profitability to 
firms aiming at entering the market. Entry decision 
depends on the possibility of earning a positive 
margin     ⏟  
    
      . In particular, only firm that 
is more efficient than the incumbent (       ) can 
enter. The ECPR therefore ensures that the 
provision of the complementary good (final service) 
in the competitive segment cannot be made by an 
entrant less efficient than the integrated bottleneck 
owner.  
The ECPR formula (5) is also known as the Access 
Pricing Parity –Principle Rule. Indeed, as advocated 
by Baumol, Ordover and Willig (1997), it comes 
from “obvious” equity logic based on the efficiency 
principle. The price charged by entrant    should be 
equal to the marginal cost incurred to provide its 
retail service (      ). This means that      
    (A) .At the same time, under the assumptions 
that the incumbent and entrant provide perfect 
                                                          
23 When the provision of one unit of the retail service 
requires any portion   of the access service, the ECPR 
rule is generalized as follows:              
      (Armstrong 2002). 
substitute final services and that the incumbent pay 
the same charge   to purchase the bottleneck input 
from itself, we must have            
 
     
      
→     
                  (B). Therefore 
(5) is obtained from combining (A) and (B). The 
Access Pricing Parity –Principle Rule simply says 
that the bottleneck owner prices the input for itself at 
the same price that charges for its competitors.  
From practical perspective, the ECPR appears a 
simple cost-based approach. It is simply the 
difference between the incumbent‟s retail price 
assumed optimally fixed and the retail marginal 
cost. This explains broadly its popularities in 
practice compared to Ramsey rule that requires 
greater volume of information about costs and 
elasticities of demand. In October 1994, the New 
Zealand Appeal Court considers the ECPR as the 
best appropriate access pricing rule to promote 
efficient competition in telecom markets (Laffont and 
Tirole 1996). This pricing rule is also suggested in 
other telecom legislations under the name “retail 
minus” (e.g., in mobile sector in United Kingdom) 
(Valleti and Estache 1998).  
From theoretical perspectives, economists show 
some reservations about the ECPR role in 
promoting effective competition under more realistic 
market circumstances. Economides and Lawrence 
(1995) point out that the ECPR violates the 
allocative efficiency principle and it only focuses on 
the productive efficiency goal.  Precisely, these 
authors say that this approach protects monopoly 
rents and extracts consumer surplus since it does 
not require any rules on the incumbent‟s retail price 
determination. In the absence of any additional 
regulatory instruments such as final price controls, 
the bottleneck owner may charge monopolist‟s price 
for the retail service, which exceeds broadly the 
marginal cost of its provision. In this case, 
consumers do not benefit from competition since 
the incumbent continue to benefit from supernormal 
rents even in the presence of competitors. In line 
with these critiques, Laffont and Tirole (1996) and 
Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996) underline this 
ECPR limit and consider that this pricing rule is a 
partial rule because it does not objectively specify 
how retail prices are fixed (it just assumes that 
incumbent sets optimally its retail prices). Laffont 
and Tirole (1996) note that in related markets, an 
optimal access pricing rule should be a part of “an 
overall regulatory scheme” that takes into account 
both demand and supply aspects and integers 
policies and tools that also permit to ensure 
optimality of final prices (oriented to marginal costs) 
.  They also show that the ECPR is in fact a special 
ideal case of the Ramsey approach. In particular, 
when demand and costs of the incumbent and its 
rivals in the competitive segment have symmetric 
properties (same cost structures and demand 
functions), the Ramsey rule yields the ECPR24. 
However, under the case of asymmetric demand or 
costs (presence of switching costs, incumbent‟s 
technological superiority, etc.), the ECPR is 
inefficient.  Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996) 
also criticize the non-realistic assumptions of the 
ECPR approach and propose important extensions. 
Considering a setting of complete information and 
assuming that the incumbent‟s retail price is given, 
they show that the ECPR is closely related to the 
Ramsey approach. Under the ECPR assumptions, 
the Ramsey formula coincides exactly with the 
margin rule. However, when many ECPR 
assumptions are relaxed including the retail market 
contestability, the no bypass possibilities and 
homogenous retail services hypothesis, the optimal 
access price can be defined as the incumbent‟s 
marginal cost of the retail service plus a term that 
consists on a more relevant definition of the ECPR 
opportunity costs25 majored by a Ramsey term 
based on normal (not super) price elasticities of 
demand.  
 
     To summarize, the ECPR appears an efficient 
practical solution in the absence of retail price 
distortions and market imperfections. The Ramsey 
approach is strong theoretically and convenient 
under several market circumstances but it is 
complex in practice. Further, basing tariffs only on 
costs raises concern of access deficit recovery and 
may lead to inefficient entry. Price cap solution 
covers access deficit of incumbent. But, it presents 
some limitations in practice, and it may also 
encourage the anti-competitive behavior (predation 
problem). In sum, there is no ideal solution. 
Nevertheless, basing on these access pricing 
approaches, regulatory frameworks have leaded to 
more practical solutions. 
                                                          
24 Under the assumption on “fully symmetric” demand 
and cost functions,  ̂      . By replacing this last in (2) 
and (3), we obtain                      ⏞   
 
  
      
→                          (see Laffont and Tirole 
(1995), p. 242). 
25 These authors suggest a new notion of the ECPR 
opportunity costs that is the reduction of the incumbent’s 
profits due to provide a marginal unit of access to rivals.  
4. Concluding remarks  
     In this paper, we have provided a survey of the 
technical and economic characteristics of the 
telecommunication industry, and a comparative 
critical analysis of the main access pricing 
approaches that are served as benchmarks to build 
the regulatory frameworks after opening the telecom 
markets to competition.   
     The economies of scale and scope combined 
with the network externalities explain broadly the 
dominance of the monopoly structure in telecom 
industry in the past. After the introduction of 
competition, the technology mutations do not 
remove the large costs of network deployment and 
therefore the historical integrated monopoly (the 
incumbent) is still in most countries the sole owner 
of the infrastructure facilities that constitute 
essential input to provide end-users services. 
Entrants are permitted access to these 
infrastructures at regulated terms because access 
negotiations between entrant and incumbent usually 
do not permit to reach successful agreement. This 
explains why the regulation must have an important 
role even after the introduction of competition.  
A central part of these access negotiations concern 
the price of access to the essential infrastructures. 
Facts show that the incumbent usually sets high 
access price (relatively to the cost of the access 
service provision) in order to protect its profits of 
monopoly and thereby extract consumer surplus. 
The role of the regulator consists to prevent this 
anti-competitive behavior. Nevertheless, setting low 
access price may lead to incumbent‟s access deficit 
and inefficient entry.  
    The earlier theoretical contributions suggest 
different access pricing solutions that provide 
excellent benchmarks for regulators but present 
important limitations. The first best theoretical 
outcome, also called the marginal rule (cost-based 
pricing) which in practice leads to pure LRIC or FDC 
regulatory methods, rises problem of incumbent‟s 
fixed cost recovery. Theoretically, the second best 
solution (the Ramsey rule) is considered the 
strongest because it leads to optimal retail and 
access prices that satisfy both the objective of 
allocative efficiency by covering incumbent‟s access 
deficit and the objective of productive efficiency by 
maximizing consumer welfare. However, the 
Ramsey rule has the limitation to be complex to 
implement in practice because it requires great 
information about costs and demand. The 
alternative practical solution to Ramsey prices, the 
global price cap (i.e. price ceilings for both access 
and final services), does not present a complete 
remedy to this informational problem. The global 
price cap raises other concerns such as the 
predation problem. The simplicity of Baumol-Willig 
margin rule, also known as the Efficient Component 
–Pricing rule (ECPR), that consists in pricing the 
access service as the difference between the 
incumbent‟ retail price and the marginal cost of the 
provision of the retail service is practical (it is 
applied under the name “retail minus” ). However, 
the ECPR violates the allocative efficiency principle 
since there is a risk that the incumbent charges 
monopoly retail prices and extracts the consumer 
surplus and thereby remove the benefits of 
competition.  
        In practice, in addition to access price 
regulation, policy makers use other instruments to 
control the abuse of the market power of the 
incumbent firm. These instruments consist in the 
unbundling (different technical modalities of access 
to incumbent‟s facilities) and separation policies 
(structural or behavioral organization of the 
incumbent‟s firm)26.  
   Recent literature on one-way access extends the 
debates on issues of access regulation after 
introduction of competition and focuses on more 
realistic settings. Further, this literature is also 
interested in impacts of unbundling and separation 
policies in addition to effects of access pricing 
policies.  
                                                          
26
 For a recent review of the regulatory practices in the 
fixed telecom sector see BEN DKHIL (2014 a). For 
further understanding of these reforms, their 
classification and impacts on the broadband infrastructure 
deployment and innovation see  Ben Dkhil (2014 b). 
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